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1 Introduction
We analyse the determination of taxes on goods whose current consumption causes util-
ity costs (for example negative health e¤ects) in the future. When consumers have time-
inconsistent preferences, they consume too much of such goods. Using sin taxesto correct
distortions in the consumption of harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems
has also been considered in ODonoghue and Rabin (2003; 2006).
Market-based mechanisms for correcting the distortion caused by self-control problems
are likely to be ine¤ective (see Köszegi (2005)), and consumers might thus value sin taxes as a
commitment device. In addition to the monetary cost of taxation, sin taxes a¤ect individual
utility due to the corrective nature of the tax when preferences are time-inconsistent. If this
positive e¤ect outweighs the monetary cost, sin taxes can improve individual welfare - see
Gruber and Köszegi (2004) and Kotakorpi (2006) for theoretical analyses and Gruber and
Mullainathan (2005) for empirical evidence.
The purpose of the current paper is two-fold. Firstly, we contribute to the discussion on
optimal sin taxes by deriving an explicit rule for the optimal tax in a second-best setting
where individuals di¤er in their degree of self-control problems. Secondly, we examine how
sin taxes are determined in political equilibrium, a question that has to our knowledge not
yet been analysed in the literature.
Many economists have been concerned that sin taxes as well as other paternalistic poli-
cies that are aimed at helping irrational individuals1 are often detrimental for the welfare of
rational individuals.2 This has resulted in an emphasis on the search for policies that help
irrational individuals while having only a small or no impact on those who are rational.3
However, there has recently been an interest in moving beyond studying minimal interven-
tions, to studying optimal paternalistic policies. Our analysis is particularly closely related
in this respect to ODonoghue and Rabin (2006).4
When individuals di¤er in their degree of self-control problems but a uniform sin tax
is applied, we are necessarily in a second-best situation. We analyse the trade-o¤ between
benets to irrational individuals and costs to rational individuals further, and nd the optimal
balance between them: we provide an explicit formula for the second-best optimal sin tax
1Throughout the paper, we refer to individuals with a self-control problem as irrational, as they behave
in an inconsistent manner and make consumption decisions that fail to maximise their own life-time utility.
Similar terminology has been used for example by ODonoghue and Rabin (2006).
2Beyond this concern, some economists remain sceptical about paternalism for more general reasons - see
for example Glaeser (2006) for a critical view. For example, the possibility of government failure may reduce
the e¤ectiveness and desirability of paternalistic policies. Despite the importance of this consideration, we
abstract from this issue in the current paper. On the other hand, we show that in our model consumers would
themselves vote for paternalistic policies: such policies can therefore be the outcome of a democratic decision
making process, which has interesting implications for the justication of paternalism.
3See for example Camerer et al (2003), Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and ODonoghue and Rabin (1999).
4ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) examine the conditions under which the optimal sin tax is positive, and
whether sin taxes can yield Pareto improvements (compared to zero taxes). They further provide comparative
statics of the optimal sin tax when there are changes in the distribution of self-control problems and tastes.
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and show that it exceeds the mean distortion in consumption. The reason is right at the
heart of the recent discussion on paternalism: for reasonable assumptions about the form
of the demand function, sin taxes have a relatively small (negative) e¤ect on the utility of
(close to) rational individuals, who consume relatively little of the good. On the other hand,
irrational consumers with a very high level of consumption gain a lot from sin taxes.
We then turn to analyse the majority voting equilibrium when individuals di¤er in their
degree of self-control problems. We assume that individuals are fully aware of their self-control
problem, and vote on the sin tax to be implemented from the next period onwards. Taxation
can then provide a commitment device that helps individuals move their consumption closer
to its optimal level.
As a benchmark, we consider the case where tax revenue is distributed back to con-
sumers in such a way that the redistributive e¤ects of taxation are eliminated. In this setting
individuals prefer the level of taxes that completely eliminates the distortion in their own
consumption, and the political equilibrium is the tax rate that corresponds to the median
level of self-control problems. We show that equilibrium taxes are in most cases below the
socially optimal level. The reason is that the asymmetric e¤ect of sin taxes at di¤erent ends
of the distribution of self-control problems is not taken into account by the median voter.
However, in this setting where sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects, there is one particular
case where the equilibrium and the social optimum coincide: this is when consumption is so
harmful that the optimal level of consumption is zero even in the absence of taxation. In
this case, it is in the interests of both the consumers and the social planner to eliminate all
consumption.
We then proceed to analyse the case where the redistributive e¤ects of sin taxes are taken
into account. This case is the one that is more relevant from a practical point of view, and also
highlights some interesting new issues. On the one hand, an individual without self-control
problems will prefer a low tax, as high taxation would cause an unnecessary distortion in
consumption from his point of view. On the other hand, however, sin taxes will redistribute
income from irrational large-scale consumers to rational consumers, a reason for consumers
with no self-control problems to vote for a high tax.
Despite these counteracting motives that a¤ect an individuals preferred tax rate, we show
that a majority voting equilibrium exists in our model also in this case, and corresponds
to the tax rate preferred by the individual with the median level of self-control problems.
Importantly, we show that when redistributive e¤ects of sin taxes are taken into account, the
equilibrium tax rate is below the socially optimal level regardless of the level of harm from
consumption. The redistributive motive for taxation implies that equilibrium taxes are below
the social optimum even when consumption is extremely harmful: the median voter does not
consume the good in equilibrium, and simply wants to maximise redistribution from irrational
individuals towards himself. On the other hand, the social planner wants to completely
eliminate consumption. It is worth emphasising that our results regarding extremely harmful
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consumption goods are very robust to di¤erent functional form assumptions and do not
depend on the distribution of self-control problems.
One of the aims of our analysis is to contribute to the policy discussion on the taxation of
harmful goods. In European countries, tobacco products are taxed much more heavily than
alcohol: the excise duty on the most popular brand of tobacco was on average approximately
60 % of the total retail price in the EU-15 member states in 2003 (Cnossen and Smart 2005),
whereas the corresponding gure was 19 % for beer, 14 % for wine and 39 % for spirits
(WHO 2004).5 It might appear that cigarette taxes are too high from a social point of view,
particularly as cigarette taxes in most countries seem to exceed the external costs of smoking
(Cnossen and Smart 2005)6. However, considering not only negative externalities, but also
harm experienced but not taken into account by the consumer himself, optimal taxes should
indeed exceed the level that would be appropriate if only externalities were taken into account.
As our analysis shows, the redistributive motive for taxation implies that equilibrium taxes
on highly harmful goods such as cigarettes may be too low from a social point of view.7
In addition to the previous literature on taxation when consumers have self-control prob-
lems, our analysis has some similarities with the analysis of commodity taxation in the
presence of externalities: negative health e¤ects (in the case of consumers with self-control
problems) as well as negative externalities are both harmful e¤ects not taken into account by
consumers, and governments might wish to alleviate these e¤ects through taxation. Diamond
(1973) has analysed optimal taxation of externality-generating goods when individuals give
rise to di¤erent (marginal) externalities.8 In the case of externalities, however, there is no
natural assumption to make about how the magnitude of the marginal externality should
be correlated with individual demand. In our context, on the other hand, a high marginal
internality is naturally associated with high consumption, since consumers with a more severe
self-control problem have a higher level of consumption, ceteris paribus. This correlation is
the mechanism that drives many of the key results in this paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2 and derive
the second-best optimal sin tax in Section 3. The political equilibrium is analysed in Section
4, where we rst study the benchmark case where sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects, and
then extend the analysis to account also for the redistributive e¤ects of sin taxes. Section 5
shows that our main conclusions extend to the case where sin taxes are also used for revenue
5The gures for alcoholic drinks were calculated using data for 9 countries only, as the gures for the rest
of the EU-15 were not reported (see WHO 2004, 54). The average total tax collections in the EU-15 member
states were approximately 100 euros per adult in the case of alcohol, and around 280 euros per capita in the
case of tobacco (see for example Cnossen (2006a) and (2006b)).
6 In the case of alcohol, on the other hand, taxes appear to be lower than the level that would be mandated
even by externality considerations alone (Cnossen 2006a)
7The relatively low prevalence of smoking suggests that cigarettes t our category of highly harmful sub-
stances (where most people abstain from consumption): smoking prevalence is around 20-30% in most EU
countries, whereas only around 15% of adult Europeans abstain from alcohol consumption (Anderson and
Baumberg 2006, European Commission 2004).
8See Eerola and Huhtala (2007) for a recent contribution to the literature on the political economy aspects
of environmental policy.
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raising purposes. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model where consumers have a quasi-hyperbolic discount function (Laibson
1997), using a set-up that is similar to ODonoghue and Rabin (2003; 2006). Life-time utility
of an individual is given by
Ut = (ut; :::; uT ) = ut + i
TX
s=t+1
s tus; (1)
where i;  2 (0; 1) and ut is the periodic utility function. Individuals are therefore assumed to
be identical in all other respects, but they di¤er in their degree of quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing. We assume that the quasi-hyperbolic discount factor  has a distribution function F ()
with mean E () and median med: Throughout the paper we consider the general case where
 has the support [L; H ], with 0  L < H  1. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies
that preferences are time-inconsistent: discounting is heavier between today and tomorrow,
than any two periods that are both in the future.
We assume that individuals derive utility from a composite good (z), which is taken as
the numeraire, and another good (x) which is harmful in the sense that it yields positive
utility in the short-run, but has some negative e¤ects in the long-run. Specically, we assume
that periodic utility is given by
ut (xt; xt 1; zt) = v(xt)  h (xt 1) + zt; (2)
where v0 > 0; v00 < 0 and the harm function9 is characterised by h0 > 0 and h00 > 0:
We assume that there is no borrowing or lending. In each period, consumers then choose
x to maximize10 u(x) = v(x) ih (x)+z subject to a per-period budget constraint qx+z 
B + S. We assume that product markets are competitive and normalise the producer price
to 1, and q = 1+  denotes the consumer price of good x: B is the consumers income (taken
to be exogenous) and S is a possible lump-sum subsidy received by the consumer from the
government. Taxes and subsidies will be modelled in more detail in later sections. Given the
above specication, the demand for good x satises
v0(x)  ih0 (x) = q: (3)
9As in ODonoghue and Rabin (2006), we assume that the marginal benets and marginal costs of con-
sumption are independent of past consumption levels. In such a setting, it is not essential that the harm is
modelled as occuring only in the period following consumption - h can be thought of as the discounted sum of
harm occurring in all future periods. See Gruber and Köszegi (2004) for an analysis where past consumption
a¤ects current marginal utility.
10We have dropped the time index t, since with our specication consumption is constant accross periods.
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However, the time-inconsistency in preferences implies that the consumer would like to
change his behaviour in the future: from the next period onwards, the consumer would like to
choose consumption levels that maximise11 uo(x) = v (x)  h (x) + z: We take this long-run
perspective as the one relevant for welfare evaluation - this has become a standard choice in the
literature on sin taxes (see for example Gruber and Köszegi (2004), ODonoghue and Rabin
(2003; 2006)). There are clear reasons that justify this choice of welfare criterion: Firstly,
we assume that taxes are implemented from the period after the policy decision is made.
Therefore, consumers themselves agree that uo(x) is the relevant utility function, and voting
decisions will be made based on maximising this function. We thus use the same criterion
consistently when deriving both the optimum and the equilibrium level of taxes. Further,
uo(x) is the utility function that applies to all periods except for the present one. Since we
consider an innite number of periods, the weight of any single period should be negligible as
long as periods are su¢ ciently short12. This latter consideration applies irrespective of the
timing of the model.
The optimal level of consumption therefore satises v0(xo)   h0 (xo) = q : because of
quasi-hyperbolic discounting ( < 1); the equilibrium level of consumption of the harmful
good (x) is higher than the optimal level (xo):
3 The second-best optimal sin tax
We argued above that long-run utility is the appropriate welfare criterion in our model. The
social welfare function is then given by W (q)  R Hl G (V (q;)) f()d, where V (q;) is
the long-run indirect utility function. We assume that the function G (:) is utilitarian, and
the social welfare function therefore becomes
W (q) =
R H
l
V (q;) f()d = E [V (q;)]
= E [v (x
 (q;))  h (x (q;))  qx (q;) + S (q; )] +B;
where x satises (3) and is therefore distorted whenever  < 1, as argued above. Taking into
account the governments budget constraint E [x (q;)] = E [S (q; )], the social welfare
function can be written as
W (q) = E [V (q;)] = E [v (x
 (q;))  h (x (q;))  x (q;)] +B:
Given the distortion in consumption caused by quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the govern-
ment may consider imposing a sin tax on harmful goods as a corrective measure. The social
11See equation (1) and think of a consumer in period t, making consumption decisions for period t + 1
onwards.
12See also Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 4) for a discussion on this point.
5
planners rst-order condition is
E
h
@V (q;)
@q
i
= E
h
[v0 (x (q;))  h0 (x (q;))  1] @x(q;)@q
i
= E
h
[   (1  ) h0 (x (q;))] dx(q;)dq
i
= 0;
(4)
where the last step was obtained by using (3).
As we consider a case where a uniform tax is applied, choosing the optimal tax involves
a trade-o¤ between helping consumers with a severe self-control problem, whilst causing a
distortion for those who are rational. From (4), the second-best optimal tax is given by
 o = E

(1  )h0 (x (q;))+ Cov
h
(1  )h0 (x (q;)) ; @x(q;)@q
i
E
h
@x(q;)
@q
i : (5)
It should be noted that the socially optimal tax rate is independent of the way in
which tax revenue is distributed back to consumers, that is, of the form of the function
S ( ; ) : Therefore, in both of the cases considered below - that is, regardless of whether sin
taxes have redistributive e¤ects or not - the socially optimal tax rate is given by (5).
In order to get clearer results in the current and the next section, we make the following
assumption about the functional forms of v(x) and h(x):
Assumption 1 (i) v000 (x)  0 and (ii)  2  h000(x)h0(x)
[h00(x)]2
 1:
Assumption 1 is satised for commonly used functional forms, for example when v is of the
CRRA or CARA-variety13 or quadratic, and when the harm function is linear14, quadratic,
exponential or h(x) = xs where s  4=3.
We can now proceed to analyse the socially optimal tax rate in (5). The rst term,
E [(1  )h0 (x)] ; is the average distortion caused by self-control problems in the economy.
It can be shown that the second term in (5) is positive given Assumption 1. We can therefore
state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The socially optimal sin tax is higher than the average distortion caused by
self-control problems, that is,  o > E [(1  )h0 (x (q;))] .
Proof. See the appendix.
It is shown in the appendix that a su¢ cient condition for Proposition 1 is that @
2x(q;)
@q@ >
0, which holds given Assumption 1. The condition @
2x(q;)
@q@ > 0 has a very intuitive expla-
nation: it implies that taxation has a larger impact on irrational consumers with a very high
13Kimball (1990) provides an economic interpretation of the condition v000 > 0; albeit from a context that is
rather di¤erent from ours: v000 > 0 is associated with the concept of prudence, and implies that precautionary
savings of risk averse individuals increase with increased uncertainty.
14Note that when the harm function is linear, part (i) of Assumption 1 has to hold as a strict inequality.
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level of consumption (  0) than on rational consumers with a moderate level of consump-
tion (  1). The benet of a high sin tax for consumers with a severe self-control problem
thus exceeds the (negative) impact on the utility of (close to) rational individuals, and the
socially optimal sin tax therefore exceeds the average distortion.
4 Political equilibrium
From the point of view of the consumer, the problem is that he would like to consume less in
the future, but repeatedly fails to do so due to self-control problems. We assume throughout
the analysis that consumers are sophisticated - that is, they are completely aware of their self-
control problem15. However, market-based mechanisms for correcting the distortion caused
by time-inconsistent preferences are likely to be ine¤ective (see Köszegi (2005)): even though
both consumers and rms would have the incentive, ex ante, to sign contracts that implement
the optimal level of consumption, in a competitive market consumers cannot be prevented
from purchasing from other rms ex post. Consumption of harmful goods is therefore as
if only a spot market was available (that is, suboptimally high). To the extent that laws
on commodity taxation cannot be changed each period, sophisticated consumers might thus
value sin taxes as a way of committing to a lower level of consumption in the future.
In this section we analyse the level of taxes that will emerge in a political equilibrium
and compare the equilibrium tax rate with the social optimum. In each case considered
below, we assume that consumers vote over a sin tax to be implemented in all subsequent
periods, starting from the period following the vote16. As the utility from all subsequent
periods is discounted exponentially, the individuals policy preference function is given by his
indirect long-run utility function, V (q;i) = v (x
 (q;i)) h (x (q;i))+z: the individuals
preferred tax rate will be the one that maximises his long-run utility, taking into account the
fact that actual consumption decisions will be distorted in the absence of a sin tax.
Finally, we assume that the outcome of the vote is determined by direct majority rule17.
15The concepts of sophistication and naivete (complete unawareness of ones self-control problem), were
discussed already by Strotz (1955-6) and Pollak (1968) and have been recently analysed in numerous papers -
see for example ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) for an analysis of the implications of both sophistication and
naivete, and ODonoghue and Rabin (2001) for a model that introduces a formalisation of the intermediate
case of partial naivete. Since there are no intertemporal linkages in the marginal benets and costs of con-
sumption in our model, consumption decisions (in the absence of commitment) would be the same for naifs
and sophisticates. However, voting decisions depend on whether the individual is aware of his self-control
problem: (partially) naive individuals would vote for a lower tax than sophisticated individuals.
16 If consumers were to vote on taxes only for this period, all consumers would vote for zero taxes; and if
they were to vote on taxes to be implemented forever but including the current period, they would vote for a
lower level of taxes than implied by the analysis below (the socially optimal level of taxes would also be lower;
see Gruber and Köszegi (2004, 1967)) .
17The same results hold if there is a representative democracy with two-party electoral competition, the
parties can fully commit to a tax policy and care only about their chances of being elected (and do not have
preferences over the level of taxes themselves) - this would be a simple case of Downsian electoral competition
(Downs (1957); see also Persson and Tabellini (2000)).
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4.1 Benchmark: sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects
Even though the social optimum is una¤ected by the way in which tax revenue is distributed
back to consumers, consumers clearly will not be indi¤erent about the subsidies that they
receive. The shape of the function S ( ; ) thus has an e¤ect on the political equilibrium. Con-
sider rst the case where the tax has no redistributive e¤ects18, namely S ( ; ) = x (q;) :19
The long-run indirect utility function of individual i and therefore the policy preference func-
tion of individual i is then given by
V (q;i) = v (x
 (q;i))  h (x (q;i))  (1 + )x (q;i) + x (q;i) +B (6)
= v (x (q;i))  h (x (q;i))  x (q;i) +B:
where x again satises (3).
4.1.1 The case of moderately harmful consumption
In the case where sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects, the comparison between the equilib-
rium and the social optimum turns out to depend on the extent of harm from consumption.
Let us rst analyse the political equilibrium in the case where current consumption causes
harm in the future, but the optimal (rational) level of consumption is nevertheless positive
at zero taxes, that is v0 (0)   h0 (0)   1 > 0. Using similar steps as in the previous section,
the rst-order condition is given by
@V (q;)
@q
=

   (1  ) h0 (x (q;)) @x (q;)
@q
(7)
and each individuals preferred tax rate is given by
 () = (1  ) h0 (x (q;)) : (8)
The policy preference function (6) is single-peaked20, and a majority voting equilibrium
therefore exists and the tax rate preferred by the voter with the median most preferred level
of taxes is chosen in equilibrium. Further, policy preferences are clearly monotonic in :
in the absence of redistribution, each individual prefers the tax rate that fully corrects the
distortion in consumption. Since the distortion term (1  ) h0 (x (q;)) is decreasing in
, the individually preferred tax rate is monotonically increasing in the level of self-control
problems. Given this monotonicity, the tax rate chosen in a majority voting equilibrium is
18 In the present setting, it would also be possible to set individual-specic taxes. However, this case would
not be very interesting, as there would then be no interpersonal trade-o¤s to be settled. The case of individual-
specic transfers is also rather unrealistic, but it is useful for illustrating some of the key mechanisms in this
paper, and serves as a benchmark for the more realistic case where sin taxes have redistributive e¤ects.
19 It is important to note that S ( ; ) is a lump-sum payment, and the consumer cannot change the subsidy
by deviating from x:
20 d2V (q;i)
dq2
= [v00 (x)  h00 (x)]

dx
dq
2
  [v0 (x)  h0 (x)  1] d2x
dq2
< 0:
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given by
 = (1  med) h0 (x (q;med)) : (9)
We are now in a position to compare the tax rate chosen in political equilibrium, ; to
the socially optimal tax rate  o. Let us rst examine a simple case, where the harm function
is linear, namely h(x) = gx: In this case  = g (1  med) : On the other hand, equation (5)
implies that  o = g (1  E [] + ) ; where   Cov
h
(1  ) ; @x(q;)@q
i
=E
h
@x(q;)
@q
i
> 0:
Then clearly  <  o; as long as E [] < med + . That is, the equilibrium tax rate is lower
than the socially optimal rate, as long as there are enough relatively rational individuals
(when the distribution of  is not too much skewed to the right). In the appendix, we show
that this result holds also for more general harm functions.
Proposition 2 Assume that sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects and the optimal level of
consumption at zero taxes is positive. If the distribution of  is not too much skewed to the
right, the socially optimal tax rate is higher than the tax rate chosen in a majority voting
equilibrium:
Proof. See the appendix.
The reader may worry that since the tax formulae in (5) and (9) are given only in implicit
form, the result in Proposition 2 might only be related to tax rules, and not to actual tax
levels. Limitations of this type are very common in the optimal taxation literature (see for
example Gaube (2005)). However, using a Taylor-approximation of (7), we have further
shown in the appendix that dW (q)dq   @V (q;med)@q  0 for all q, and therefore the result that
 o >  is robust to this objection.21 This conclusion holds as long as the approximation
used in the proof can be considered to be valid. Given that we are in the current subsection
concerned with goods that are moderately harmful (and tax rates should therefore not be
very high), the approximation is likely to be fairly innocuous.
The case of a symmetric distribution of  is worth emphasising - in this case, intuition
might suggest that the equilibrium and the socially optimal tax rates should coincide, but
we have shown that the result  o >  nevertheless holds: there is a kind of bias in voting
behaviour that tends to make the equilibrium tax rate too low.
In order to further clarify the intuition behind the result stated in Proposition 2, let us
examine a specic example where there are three individuals with 1 = 0; 2 =
1
2 and 3 = 1.
Then med = E [] =
1
2 . The tax rate chosen in political equilibrium, 
 now equals the tax
21To show that dW (q)
dq
  @V (q;med)
@q
> 0 implies qo > q; denote (q)  dW (q)
dq
  @V (q;med)
@q
> 0 and e 
W (1) V (1; med). Now W (q) = V (q; med)+
R q
1
(bq) dbq+ e: The price level chosen in the political equilib-
rium is q = argmaxq V (q; med). Next we show that the socially optimal price level q
o = argmaxW (q) > q.
(i) Assume by contrast that qo = eq < q. Now W (eq) =W (q)  [V (q; med)  V (eq; med)]  R qeq (bq) dbq <
W (q) : Thus eq cannot be optimal, a contradiction. (ii) W 0 (q) = @V (q;med)
@q
+ (q) > 0, where the
inequality follows since
@V (q;med)
@q
= 0 and (q) > 0. Thus we can conclude that qo > q. Notice that this
proof applies even if W (q) and V (q) are multi-peaked.
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rate preferred by individual 2. The tax rate  is socially optimal if and only if
dW (q)
dq
 @V (q
;1)
@q
+
@V (q;2)
@q
+
@V (q;3)
@q
= 0
Because dV (q
;2)
dq = 0; this condition can be written as
@V (q;1)
@q
=  @V (q
;3)
@q
(10)
Typically, the condition (10) does not hold in equilibrium. As an example, assume that
v (x) = "" 1x
" 1
" and h (x) = gx and the demand function is therefore x (q;) = (q + ) " :
With these functional forms, the tax rate chosen in political equilibrium is given by
@V (q;2)
@q
= 0,  = (1  2) g =
1
2
g:
We then have that
@V (q;1)
@q
= [   (1  1) g]
@x (q; 1)
@q
=
1
2
g"

1 +
1
2

 ("+1)
> 0
@V (q;3)
@q
= [   (1  3) g]
@x (q; 3)
@q
=  1
2
g"

1 +
3
2

 ("+1)
< 0
For individual 1 with a very severe self-control problem, the best outcome would be to
have 1 = g; the preferred outcome of the fully rational individual 3 would be to have no
taxes, 3 = 0: In other words, the equilibrium tax rate is too low from the point of view of
consumer 1 and too high from the point of view of consumer 3. Further, the absolute value
of the di¤erence between the equilibrium tax rate and each individuals preferred tax rate is
the same for both individuals 1 and 3:22
j   i j = j   (1  i) gj =
1
2
g"; i = 1; 3:
Nevertheless, we have that
@x (q; 1)
@q
=

1 +
1
2
g
 ("+1)
>

1 +
3
2
g
 ("+1)
=
@x (q; 3)
@q
:
In other words, a change in the tax rate a¤ects the consumption decision of individual 1
more than it a¤ects the consumption choice of individual 3. The result is very intuitive: the
rational individual has a low level of consumption, and therefore increasing the sin tax cannot
have a very large e¤ect on his consumption level (in absolute terms). On the other hand,
the individual with a severe self-control problem has a high level of consumption, and a tax
22This equality is caused by the linearity of h (x).
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increase has a larger e¤ect on his level of consumption. Therefore we have that
@V (q;1)
@q
>  @V (q
;3)
@q
and thus
dW (q)
dq
> 0:
This example conrms our intuition that if we take the political equilibrium as a starting
point and increase the tax rate slightly, the self-control benet gained by the individual with a
severe self-control problem is higher than the loss experienced by close to rational individuals.
However, the median voter does not take this asymmetric e¤ect into account. Therefore even
if the distribution of self-control problems is symmetric, the equilibrium tax rate is below the
socially optimal level.
4.1.2 The case of very harmful consumption
Consider next the case where consumption of commodity x is so harmful that the optimal
(rational) level of consumption is zero even at zero taxes, that is, v0 (0)   h0 (0)   1  0.
It is then immediately clear that, in the social optimum, no one should consume x: The
(minimum) tax rate ( o) needed to implement the social optimum is such that even the least
rational consumer abstains, and it is given by
 o = v0 (0)  Lh0 (0)  1: (11)
It is easy to see that the socially optimal sin tax is in this case also a majority voting
equilibrium for any distribution of  and for all functional forms v(x) and h(x):
Proposition 3 Assume that sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects and the optimal level
of consumption at zero taxes is zero. The socially optimal tax is then a majority voting
equilibrium:
Proof. Individuals with i = L strictly prefer  o to any other tax rate. All individuals with
i > L strictly prefer 
o to any tax rate below ^ = v0 (0)  ih0 (0)  1 and are indi¤erent
between  o and any tax rate   [^ ;  o] :
That is, when it is optimal to abstain from the consumption of good x even in the absence
of any taxation, all consumers prefer a tax policy that will help them to achieve a zero level of
consumption. The socially optimal tax achieves this outcome and will therefore be a majority
voting equilibrium. However, we show in section 4.2.2 that this result changes when we take
into account the redistributive e¤ects of sin taxes.
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4.2 Accounting for the redistributive e¤ects of sin taxes
Let us next analyse the more realistic case where the social planner does not have information
on individual consumption levels, so that the subsidy paid to each consumer cannot be
conditioned on individual consumption. We therefore assume from now on that all consumers
receive a lump-sum transfer of equal size, and this subsidy is given by S (q;) = S (q) =
E [x (q;)] : The consumerspolicy preference function is then given by
~V (q;i) = v (x
 (q;i))  h (x (q;i))  qx + E [x (q;)] +B:
4.2.1 The case of moderately harmful consumption
Consider again rst the case where current consumption causes harm in the future, but
the optimal (rational) level of consumption is nevertheless positive at zero taxes, that is,
v0 (0) h0 (0) 1 > 0: The rst-order condition that determines voting behaviour of individual
i is now given by
@ ~V (q;i)
@q
=  (1  i)h0 (x (q;i))
@x (q;i)
@q
(12)
 x (q;i) + E [x (q;)] + E

@x (q;)
@q

:
In the case where taxation had no redistributive e¤ects it was easy to see that the indi-
viduals preferred tax rate was monotonic in the level of self-control problems and a majority
voting equilibrium was therefore guaranteed to exists. However, as noted in the introduction,
in the case where sin taxes have redistributive e¤ects there are two forces at play: on the one
hand, a person with a high level of self-control problems will prefer a high tax in order to
alleviate the distortion in his consumption decision. The corrective e¤ect of taxation is iden-
tical to the case where sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects, and is given by the rst term
in (12). On the other hand, however, a high tax will also imply a transfer of income towards
individuals with a relatively low level of consumption: this redistributive e¤ect of taxation
is captured by the remaining terms in (12). Because of these two opposite e¤ects, policy
preferences may not be well-behaved, and the existence of a majority voting equilibrium is
therefore not self-evident in this case.
A median voter equilibrium exists if policy preferences satisfy the Gans-Smart single
crossing property (Gans and Smart 1996). Gans and Smart show that when underlying
preferences are dened over a two-dimensional real choice variable but attention can be
restricted to a one-dimensional choice due to production or budget constraints (in our case
due to the consumers budget constraint), then single-crossing in the Spence-Mirrlees sense
implies single-crossing in the Gans-Smart sense.
We therefore use the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition to analyse the existence of
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a median voter equilibrium. The voterspreferences satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees condition if
votersmarginal rates of substitution between z and q;   ~Vq~Vz ; are globally monotonic in . In
our simple case of quasilinear preferences ( ~Vz = 1), the condition reduces to
@ ~V (q;i)
@q being
monotonic in :
In the appendix, we prove that @
~V (q;i)
@q@  0, and we can therefore state the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 Assume that revenue from sin taxes is distributed equally among consumers.
A majority voting equilibrium exists and the equilibrium sin tax is given by the tax rate
preferred by the consumer with the median level of self-control problems.
Proof. See the appendix.
The result @
~V (q;i)
@q@  0 implies that an individuals most preferred tax rate is again
monotonically increasing in the level of self-control problems. To gain some intuition on
why this holds also when the redistributive e¤ects of sin taxes are taken into account, using
equations (16) and (23) (see the appendix), the corrective term in (12) can be written as
 (1  i)h0 (x (q;i))
@x (q;i)
@q
= x (q;i)  x(q; 1) +  (q; i) ; (13)
where  (q; i) =
R H
i
(1   ^)@
2x(q;^)
@b2 db > 0 and  (q; i) is increasing in the level of self-
control problems (decreasing in ). As expected, the corrective e¤ect of the tax is the larger,
the more consumption x (q;i) di¤ers from the quantity chosen by the rational consumer,
x(q; 1). Further, the magnitude of the corrective e¤ect exceeds the di¤erence x (q;i)  
x(q; 1). Importantly, the di¤erence between the corrective e¤ect and the monetary cost
of the tax is increasing in the level of self-control problems: therefore, relatively irrational
individuals prefer a higher tax rate than those who are relatively rational.
To illustrate, consider again the example where v (x) = "" 1x
" 1
" and h (x) = gx: With
these functional forms, the self-control benet from taxation can be expressed as
 (1  i)h0 (x (q;i))
@x (q;i)
@q
= " (g + q)x
"+1
"
i   "xi:
It is easy to see from this expression that the self-control benet increases more than linearly
with the quantity consumed, which in turn is an increasing and convex function of self-control
problems. Hence the self-control benets increase more rapidly than monetary costs (which
depend linearly on consumption), and the individualspreferred tax rate is increasing in the
level of self-control problems.
The specic functional forms used in the previous example serve to illustrate the mech-
anism behind Proposition 4. However, the property that self-control benets increase more
rapidly than monetary costs is more general, as Proposition 4 holds for all functional forms
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that satisfy Assumption 1. The intuition is apparent when we examine the three compo-
nents that a¤ect the magnitude of self-control benets: Firstly, the harm function has been
assumed to be either linear or convex. Secondly, the sensitivity of demand to tax changes
increases with self-control problems. Finally, these two e¤ects are multiplied by the level of
self-control problems, (1   i). Hence, these three forces reinforce each other, causing the
self-control benets to quite generally increase more than linearly in the level of consumption.
It is interesting to note that even in the present case where the optimal level of con-
sumption in the absence of taxes is positive, there may be circumstances under which the
redistributive motive for taxation implies that the median voter prefers not to consume in
equilibrium, and will vote for the tax rate that maximises revenue. We have shown in the
proof of Proposition 4, however, that single-crossing holds regardless of whether the median
voter consumes the good in equilibrium or not. Therefore there cannot be situations where a
coalition of near-rational users and highly irrational heavy-users vote for highest taxes, and
are pitted against voters with an intermediate degree of rationality23.
Let us next turn to the comparison between the equilibrium and the optimum. Proposition
4 implies that the equilibrium tax rate is now given by
 =
(1  med)h0 (x (q;med))
@x(q;med)@q   x (q;med) + E [x (q;)]
E
@x(q;)@q  :
The term E [x (q;)] x (q;med) in the above formula captures the fact that if x (q;med) <
E [x
 (q;)], sin taxes imply a transfer of income towards the median voter. This will typi-
cally occur if the distribution of  is skewed to the left so that med > E [] (though it can also
occur in other cases, depending on the exact functional form of x). In such circumstances,
the median voter then votes for a higher tax than he would in the absence of redistribution.
Nevertheless, we can show that the equilibrium tax rate is again typically below the socially
optimal level:
Proposition 5 Assume that revenue from sin taxes is distributed equally among consumers.
If (1  )@2x(q;)
@2
is non-increasing in  and the distribution of  is not too much skewed to
the right, the socially optimal tax rate is higher than the tax rate chosen in a majority voting
equilibrium:
Proof. See the appendix.
23 It appears that this property might be related to our assumption of quasilinear preferences, and the implied
zero income elasticity of demand for good x. Whether more general assumptions about preferences can give
rise to voting coalitions where highly irrational consumers and fully rational consumers vote for higher taxes
than consumers with an intermediate level of rationality, is left as a question for further research. See Epple
and Romano (1996) for an analysis - albeit in a very di¤erent context - where the preferred level of public
expenditure and taxation is non-monotonic in consumer type (in their case income) when the income elasticity
of demand exceeds the (absolute value of the) price elasticity.
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In the appendix, we show that if (1 )@2x(q;)
@2
is non-increasing in , the derivative (12)
is not only increasing, but also a convex function of the level of self-control problems. The
result therefore again has a very intuitive explanation: the convexity of (12) implies that the
marginal welfare benet of high taxation for relatively irrational individuals is higher than the
corresponding welfare loss for close to rational individuals. The condition that (1 )@2x(q;)
@2
should be non-increasing in  again holds for many commonly used functional forms, for
example when v is of the CRRA or CARA-variety or quadratic, and when the harm function
is linear or h(x) = xs where s  2.
Further, in order to interpret the condition that (1  )@2x(q;)
@2
should be non-increasing
in , we show in the appendix that this holds (approximately) if a price change a¤ects the
health of irrational consumers (heavy users) more than the health of rational consumers.
This holds given Assumption 1.
Proposition 5 shows that despite the fact that high sin taxes result in a transfer of income
towards the median voter, the equilibrium tax rate is lower than the socially optimal tax:
the income transfer is not su¢ cient for the median voter to fully internalise the benet that
would accrue to highly irrational individuals, if the tax rate was increased.
For the case of moderately harmful consumption, therefore, our result is identical to the
benchmark case where sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects. If harm from consumption
is very low, this result is intuitive: in this case even rational consumers consume a lot of
the good in question, and the concern for alleviating distortions in consumption is stronger
than the motive for redistributing tax revenue. This case therefore resembles the case where
taxation has no redistributive e¤ects, discussed above, and the results are the same for the
two cases - equilibrium taxes tend to be too low.
However, in contrast to the case where sin taxes have no redistributive e¤ects, it is
important to note that the conclusion that equilibrium taxes tend to be too low holds in
the present case for all levels of harm. We turn next to the interesting case of very harmful
consumption.
4.2.2 The case of very harmful consumption
Consider again the case where consumption is so harmful that at zero taxes, the optimal
choice is to abstain from consuming the commodity x. The (minimum) tax rate ( o) needed
to implement the social optimum is then given by (11).
The condition for the result  <  o to hold in this case is especially mild, namely that
med does not coincide with the lowest level of . Further it is important to note that this
result does not depend on Assumption 1, but holds for any functional forms of v(x) and h(x):
Proposition 6 Assume that revenue from sin taxes is distributed equally among consumers
and consumption is so harmful that the optimal level of consumption at zero taxes is zero.
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Then, for any distribution of self-control problems where med > L, the socially optimal tax
rate is higher than the tax rate chosen in a majority voting equilibrium.
Proof. Since no agent consumes at  =  o, no tax revenues are collected in the social
optimum. Suppose that, starting from  =  o, the tax rate is lowered by a small amount d .
Then the least rational consumers (L) ; who were just indi¤erent between consuming and
not consuming, are triggered to consume a small amount
x (L; 
o   d) =   d
v00 (0) + Lh00 (0)
> 0:
Also, tax revenues increase from zero to   odv00(0)+Lh00(0) . Consumers other than type L still
consume no x, and the welfare of this majority group increases, due to transfers from type
L. The redistributive motive for taxation then implies that the level of taxes that eliminates
all consumption cannot arise as a political equilibrium.
5 Extension: third-best sin taxes
Our analysis can be easily generalised to the case where sin taxes not only have a corrective
role, but the government also has a revenue raising objective. Total social welfare is now
taken to be the sum of the utility from private consumption and from public funds. Let 
denote the marginal social value of revenue from the sin tax (or the marginal cost of raising
revenue from other tax bases)24. Previously, we have had that  = 1, since all tax revenue
has been returned to consumers and we have assumed that the marginal utility of (private)
income is 1. However, now we allow for the possibility that part of the tax revenue is used for
public goods and services. In the general case where the marginal value of public consumption
di¤ers from the marginal value of private consumption, we have that  6= 1.
Social welfare is now given by
W (q; ) = E [V (q; ;)] = E [v (x
 (q;))  h (x (q;))  (1 + (1  ) )x (q;)] +B:
This extension does not a¤ect the comparison between the equilibrium and the socially opti-
mal tax rate25. To see this, note that the individuals policy preference function is now given
by
~V (q;i) = v (x
 (q;i))  h (x (q;i))  qx + E [x (q;)] +B
24For simplicity, we consider a partial equilibrium set-up where demands for other goods are assumed to be
independent of the demand for the good under consideration and consequently, other tax bases are una¤ected
by the taxes in question. It is therefore also natural to assume that  is constant with respect to  .
25This holds as long as we make the conventional assumption that consumers and the social planners
valuations of public funds are identical. See Pirttilä and Tenhunen (2007) for an analysis where those valuations
may di¤er.
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and its derivative is
@ ~V (q;i)
@q
=  (1  i)h0 (x (q;i))
@x (q;i)
@q
 x (q;i) + 

E [x
 (q;)] + E

@x (q;)
@q

:
It is important to note that the part of this derivative that depends on  is independent of
, and therefore @
~V (q;i)
@q is still increasing and convex in the level of self-control problems,
as above. The equilibrium tax rate is therefore typically lower than the socially optimal tax
also in this third-best setting. We can therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Assume that sin taxes are used for revenue raising purposes. If (1 )@2x(q;)
@2
is non-increasing in  and the distribution of  is not too much skewed to the right, the third-
best optimal sin tax is higher than the tax rate chosen in a majority voting equilibrium:
However, even though the qualitative comparison between the socially optimal and the
equilibrium tax rate is not altered, incorporating a revenue raising objective into the social
welfare function does a¤ect the actual levels of taxes. Consider the socially optimal tax rate.
The third-best optimal sin tax is given by
TB =
1

E
h
(1  ) h0 (x (q;)) @x(q;)@q
i
E
h
@x(q;)
@q
i + (1  )

E [x
 (q;)]
E
h
@x(q;)
@q
i : (14)
The rst term in (14) reects the corrective role of sin taxes, whereas the second term
reects the standard public nance argument for taxation. The corrective part enters the
optimal tax formula additively, in accordance with the additivity principle familiar from the
context of environmental taxation (Sandmo 1975). If  = 1, we get the formula in (5).
Typically, however, if other taxes are distortionary,  > 1 and the public nance term is
positive. The direct e¤ect of public nance considerations is therefore to increase the socially
optimal sin tax.
On the other hand, for  > 1 the corrective part of the tax is scaled down. The fact
that the corrective part is lower than in the case where taxation only has a corrective role
is analogous to the principle of incomplete internalisation of environmental externalities in
the presence of distortive taxation (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994). This feature can be
explained by the fact that the marginal costs of harm reduction increase with the marginal
cost of public funds.
The overall e¤ect of public nance considerations on the magnitude of the optimal sin tax
is in general ambiguous. However, it is self-evident that in the case where  > 1; that is when
tax revenue has a higher weight in the social welfare function than private consumption, the
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third-best optimal sin tax is higher than the tax rate given in (5) if and only if (5) is on an
upward-sloping segment of the La¤er curve.
In some cases, for example if a part of tax revenue is wasted (for example due to admin-
istrative costs) a case where  < 1 may be relevant. In this case, the second term in (14) is
negative whereas the rst part is scaled up. Again, it is worth emphasising that our result
regarding the comparison between  and  o does not depend on the value of . Therefore,
the result that the optimal tax rate exceeds the equilibrium level of taxes holds even in the
case where part of tax revenue is wasted.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that optimal sin taxes will typically exceed the average distortion caused
by self-control problems in the economy: this result arises due to the asymmetric e¤ects of
sin taxes on the welfare of those with severe self-control problems on the one hand, and on
(close to) rational individuals on the other hand. As the median voter does not take such
asymmetries into account, the sin taxes chosen in a majority voting equilibrium are in most
cases below the socially optimal level.
The view that emerges from previous empirical literature seems to be that for example
excise duties on cigarettes are in most countries very high compared to the external costs of
smoking. However, the present analysis provides a theoretical argument that suggests that
such taxes may nevertheless be too low from a social point of view.
The analysis also suggests a reason for why it may be optimal to impose quantity restric-
tions on the consumption of certain highly harmful substances (such as illicit drugs), rather
than using price instruments alone: if we were to rely solely on tax policy to regulate the
consumption of such substances, the optimal outcome may not be reached.
It should be noted that throughout the analysis, we have assumed that individuals are
sophisticated - that is, they are fully aware of their self-control problem. Individuals thus value
sin taxes as a self-control device, and vote for positive taxes. However, if some individuals are
partially naive, their preferred tax rate will be lower than the level indicated by our results
- indeed, fully naive individuals would vote for a zero tax, as they are fully unaware of their
self-control problem. In the case where some individuals are either partially or fully naive,
therefore, the problem of sub-optimally low equilibrium taxes would be exacerbated.
Appendix
Preliminaries
The following derivatives are used a number of times in the analysis:
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@x (q; )
@
=
h0 (x)
v00 (x)  h00 (x) < 0 (15)
@x (q; )
@q
=
1
v00 (x)  h00 (x) < 0:
Given these results, the corrective e¤ect of taxation can be written as
 (1  i)h0 (x (q;i))
@x (q;i)
@q
= (1  i)
@x (q;)
@
: (16)
Proof of Proposition 1
Since E
h
@x
@q
i
< 0,  o > E [(1  )h0 (x (q;))] if Cov
h
(1  )h0 (x) ; @x@q
i
< 0. When
h00 (x)  0, (1  )h0 (x (q;)) is decreasing in : Therefore, Cov
h
(1  )h0 (x) ; dxdq
i
< 0
if @
2x(q;)
@q@ > 0. This derivative is given by
@2x (q;)
@q@
=
  [v000(x)  h000(x)] @x@ + h00(x)
[v00 (x)  h00 (x)]2 :
It can be shown that @
2x(q;)
@q@ > 0 if (su¢ cient conditions) v
000 (x)  0 and
h000 (x)h0 (x)
[h00 (x)]2
<
h00 (x)  v00 (x)
h00 (x)
:
Clearly h
00(x) v00(x)
h00(x) > 1. Thus the above condition is less demanding than
h000 (x)h0 (x)
[h00 (x)]2
 1:
Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof, we rst show that the right hand side of (5) is larger than the right hand side
of (9). Secondly, we derive a condition that guarantees dW (q)dq   @V (q;med)@q  0. Thirdly, we
interpret this condition, and use an approximation to show that it holds in our model.
i) In the text we show that the proposition holds for a linear h (x). If h (x) is not linear,
then
E

(1  )h0 (x (q;)) 6= (1  med)h0 (x (q;med))
even if med = E []. In particular, if () = (1  )h0 (x (q;)) is a convex function of ,
then the Jensen inequality implies that
E

(1  )h0 (x (q;)) > (1  E [])h0 (x (q;E [])) = (1  med)h0 (x (q;med)) :
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We therefore need to show that d
2()
d2
> 0. Now,
d()
d
=  h0 (x) + (1  )h00 (x) dx

d
;
d2()
d2
=

(1  )d
2x
d2
  2dx

d

h00 (x) + (1  )h000 (x)

dx
d
2
:
It can be shown that d
2()
d2
> 0 if v000 (x)  0 and
h000 (x)h0 (x)
[h00 (x)]2
>  2v
00 (x)  h00 (x)
v00 (x)
h00 (x)  v00 (x)
h00 (x)
: (17)
Clearly,
v00 (x)  h00 (x)
v00 (x)
h00 (x)  v00 (x)
h00 (x)
> 1
Thus (17) is less demanding than
h000 (x)h0 (x)
[h00 (x)]2
  2: (18)
Therefore () = (1  )h0 (x) is a convex function of  if v000 (x)  0 and (18) holds
(su¢ cient conditions). The condition (18) essentially states that h000 (x) should not be too
small, or equivalently, h0 (x) should not be too concave: harm and therefore also self-control
benets from consumption depend on h0 (x). Excessive concavity of h0 (x) might thus o¤set
the e¤ect of increasing sensitivity to taxation as self-control problems get worse.
ii) Next, we show that dW (q)dq   @V (q;med)@q  0. For the remaining proofs, we nd if useful
to adopt the notation   1 , where  measures the degree of self-control problems directly:
for fully rational consumers  = 0; and for fully myopic consumers  = 1.
Using (16), @V (q;)@q can therefore be written as
@V (q; )
@q
=

   h0 (x(q; )) @x (q; )
@q
= 
@x (q; )
@q
+ 
@x (q; )
@
=
@V (q; L)
@q
+
Z 
L


@2x (q;b)
@q@^
+ b@2x (q;b)
@b2 + @x (q;b)@b

db:
Adopting the notation
	(q; ) = 
@2x (q; )
@q@
+ 
@2x (q; )
@2
+
@x (q; )
@
; (19)
20
we know that @V (q;)@q is a convex function of  if
@	(q; )
@
 0: (20)
Given this convexity, E
h
@V (q;)
@q
i
> @V (q;E[])@q for all q. Also, since
@2V (q;)
@q@ > 0, we can
conclude that
dW (q)
dq
= E

@V (q; )
@q

>
@V (q; med)
@q
if
med  E [] : (21)
Therefore the equilibrium tax is lower than the socially optimal tax if (20) and (21) hold
(su¢ cient conditions).
iii) Next, we proceed to interpreting condition (20). First note that (16) implies that
@x (q; )
@
=   @h (x
 (q; ))
@q
: (22)
This is the e¤ect of a price change on health. First-order Taylor series approximation with
respect to  and q yields
@x (q; )
@
' @x
 (1; 0)
@
+ 
@2x (q; )
@2
+ 
@x (q; )
@@q
(note that the derivatives are evaluated at (q; )): Solving the above expression for  @x
(q;)
@@q
and substituting into (19) yields
	(q; ) ' 2@x
 (q; )
@
  @x
 (1; 0)
@
:
The second term in this expression is a constant. Therefore, 	(q; ) is increasing in , if
@x(q;)
@ is increasing in . Condition (20) therefore states that a price change a¤ects the
health of irrational consumers (heavy users) more than the health of rational consumers.
Finally, we can check that this holds in our model:
@

  dh(x(q;))dq

@
=  

h0 (x (q; ))
@x (q; )
@q
@x (q; )
@
+ h00 (x (q; ))
@x2 (q; )
@q@

> 0:
The inequality follows from Assumption 1, which guarantees that @x
2(q;)
@q@ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
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To prove the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, we have to show that the Spence-
Mirrlees single-crossing condition is satised. Since we assume quasi-linear preferences this
reduces to showing that @
~V (q;)
@q is monotonic in .
The e¤ect of a marginal tax change on the welfare of type  is now given by (12). Note
that
x (q; ) = x (q; L)+
Z 
L
@x (q;b)
@b db = x (q; L)+@x (q; )@  L@x (q; L)@  
Z 
L
b@2x (q;b)
@b2 db:
(23)
Substituting (16) and (23) into (12) shows that
@ ~V (q; )
@q
=
@ ~V (q; L)
@q
+
Z 
L
b@2x (q;b)
@b2 db: (24)
Di¤erentiating with respect to  yields
@2 ~V (q; )
@q@
= 
@2x (q; )
@2
 0: (25)
Notice that these results hold even when some individuals do not consume in equilibrium,
that is, x (q; ) = 0 for  2 [L;e (q)] ; where e (q) is given by
v0 (0)  (1  e) h0 (0)  q = 0, e (q) = 1  v0 (0)  q
h0 (0)
:
Then
@ ~V (q; )
@q
=
d ~V (q; L)
dq
= E [x (q;)] + E

@x (q; )
@q

for  2 [L;e (q)]
@ ~V (q; )
@q
= E [x (q; )] + E

@x (q; )
@q

+ e (q) @x (q;e (q))
@
+
Z 
e(q) b@
2x (q;b)
@b2 db for  > e (q) :
Proof of Proposition 5
From (24), @
~V (q;)
@q is a convex function of  if 
@2x(q;)
@2
is increasing in : Given this convexity,
the same argument as in the Proof of Proposition 2 shows that dW (q)dq >
@ ~V (q;med)
@q :
To interpret the condition that @
2x(q;)
@2
should be increasing in , a rst-order Taylor
approximation shows that the health e¤ect of taxation can be written as
  @h (x (q; ))
@q
=
@x (q; )
@
' @x (q; 0)
@
+ 
@2x (q; )
@2
:
Again, we therefore require that a price change a¤ects the health of irrational consumers
(heavy users) more than the health of rational consumers.
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